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Real Property
by T. Daniel Brannan*
and
William J. Sheppard"

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys case law and legislative developments in Georgia
law of real property during the period from June 1, 1997 to May 31,
1998. The cases and statutes discussed in this Article were chosen for
their significance to practitioners in Georgia, and not every case decided
or statute passed during the survey period is mentioned. Of particular
note, in one case decided during the survey period, the Georgia Court of
Appeals clarified the reach of the Commercial Real Estate Broker Lien
Act 1 by defining what services will support the filing and foreclosure of
a broker's lien under the statute.2
II.

TITLE TO LAND AND BOUNDARY LINES

In Mathis v. Hammond,3 Clyde Hammond filed an action to remove
a cloud on his title to certain land created through his wife's execution
of a warranty deed for her interest in that property. Prior to 1988, Mr.
Hammond held fee simple title to the subject property. In 1988 Mr.
Hammond executed a warranty deed by which he conveyed his interest
in the property to himself and his new wife, May Mathis Hammond, as
joint tenants with rights of survivorship. In May 1993, Ms. Hammond

* Partner in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia
State University (B.A., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1986); Mercer University (J.D., 1992). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-600 to -605 (1982 & Supp. 1998).
2. See Padgett v. City of Moultrie, 229 Ga. App. 500, 494 S.E.2d 299 (1997) discussed
infra, section V.
3. 268 Ga. 158, 486 S.E.2d 356 (1997).
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deeded her interest in that property to her children. At the time Ms.
Hammond executed that deed, she was terminally ill and was residing
in her daughter's home. Ms. Hammond died in September 1993 after
having executed a will leaving her property to her children. Shortly
after his wife's death, Mr. Hammond executed a deed to the subject
property with himself as grantor in which he deeded the survivorship
interests to himself. Thereafter, both Mr. Hammond and his deceased
wife's children claimed an interest in the property. Mr. Hammond then
filed an action to quiet title in himself.4
The confusion concerning the effect of the deed from Ms. Hammond to
her children arises from a provision contained in O.C.G.A. section 44-6190,' in which Georgia recognizes the creation of a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship.6 Section 44-6-190 states, in part, that the tenancy
estate or interest "may be severed as to the interest of any owner by the
recording of an instrument which results in his lifetime transfer of all
or a part of his interest."7 As the court in Mathis noted, the enactment
of that provision may have changed the common law rule regarding joint
tenancies with rights of survivorship." The transfer of an interest by
one joint tenant would, under a literal reading of the language of section
44-6-190, result in a termination of the joint tenancy with a resulting
tenancy
in common between the remaining co-owners and the purchas9
er.
Apparently Mr. Hammond recognized the uncertainty created by the
language of section 44-6-190. In order to avoid any question concerning
the application of that statute, Mr. Hammond asserted that the deed
from his ex-wife to her children should be canceled because it was
procured by undue influence. ° At the close of the evidence, Ms.
Hammond's children moved for a directed verdict, claiming that Mr.
Hammond had failed to produce any evidence of undue influence. The

4. Id. at 159, 486 S.E.2d at 357.
5. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-190 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
6. 268 Ga. at 160, 486 S.E.2d at 358.
7. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-190.
8. 268 Ga. at 160, 486 S.E.2d at 358 (citing 2 GEORGE A. & GEORGINE S. PINDAR,
GEORGIA REAL EsTATE LAW § 19-13 n.2 (4th ed.) and Wallace v. Wallace, 260 Ga. 400, 396
S.E.2d 208 (1990)).
9. Id.
10. Id. O.C.G.A. §§ 23-2-58 to -60 permit cancellation of a deed based upon the exertion
of undue influence by the grantee over the grantor. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-60 (1982 & Supp.
1998). See also Arnold v. Freeman, 181 Ga. 654, 183 S.E. 811 (1936). Mr. Hammond also
asserted that the deed was contrary to a prenuptial agreement between the parties.
However, based on the court's ruling concerning the allegations of undue influence, the
prenuptial agreement was discussed only briefly. 268 Ga. at 160-61, 486 S.E.2d at 358-59.
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Also, over the objection of Ms.

Hammond's children, the trial court instructed the jury on the "presumption" of undue influence.1" The trial court said that such a presumption
arises when the grantee of property has a confidential relationship with
the grantor and the grantor is of "weak mentality." 13 Ms. Hammond's
children argued that the presumption of undue influence was inapplicable because Mr. Hammond failed to produce any evidence that Ms.
Hammond was of a "weak mentality." 4 Judgment was entered in Mr.
Hammond's favor, and Ms. Hammond's children appealed, asserting
error in the denial of their motion for directed verdict and the trial
court's instruction to the jury. 5
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling on both issues. 6
First, the court agreed that Mr. Hammond presented sufficient evidence
of undue influence to submit the issue to the jury.'7 Specifically, the
court found that evidence existed of a confidential relationship between
Ms. Hammond and her children based on Ms. Hammond's advanced age,
her terminally-ill physical condition, and her residence with her
daughter (and the care, shelter, and transportation Ms. Hammond
received from her).'5
Second, the court rejected appellants' argument concerning the jury
instruction on the presumption of undue influence. 9 In doing so, the
court stated that the phrase "weak mentality" in the context of the jury
instruction given by the trial court "covers not only feeble-mindedness
but also, in the case of an elderly grantor, the domination of the grantor
by the grantee, exemplified by the grantee's provision of shelter and
care."" Therefore, the fact that Ms. Hammond was elderly and being
provided shelter and care by at least one of the grantees under her deed
was evidence to support the trial court's charge on the presumption of
undue influence. 2' For these reasons, the court affirmed the jury
verdict in Mr. Hammond's favor.22

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

268 Ga. at 160-61, 486 S.E.2d at 358-59.
Id., 486 S.E.2d at 358.
Id. at 160, 486 S.E.2d at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 160-61, 486 S.E.2d at 358-59.
Id. at 160, 486 S.E.2d at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161, 486 S.E.2d at 358-59.
Id., 486 S.E.2d at 359.
Id.

310

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

The court in Mathis had an opportunity to clarify the ambiguity
created by section 44-6-190. However, the manner in which Mr.
Hammond presented his case permitted the court to avoid deciding that
issue. As a result of the court's narrowly drawn decision, the uncertainty in Georgia law concerning transfers of a single person's interest in
property under a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship remains for
future clarification.
In Bell v. Owens,23 the court of appeals considered a dispute over title
to a section of property along a border between two adjoining tracts of
land in Haralson County, Georgia.24 Donna Owens, Jason Owens,
Bryan Owens, and Dawn Godwin (the "Owens Children") filed an action
against William Bell ("Bell") to establish ownership of the disputed
property. Bell and the Owens Children owned adjoining parcels of land
that, at one point, were part of a single tract owned by Otis Bennett. In
1949 Bennett sold approximately four acres of the subject property to
C.M. Clackum. Those four acres were ultimately purchased by Mr. Bell.
In 1950 Bennett sold the remaining portion of his property to the Owens
Children's predecessor-in-title. The deed for the property now owned by
the Owens Children described their property as "the entire parcel 'except
four acres sold to C.M. Clackum."'25 Shortly after Bennett's sale of the
second tract, the Owens Children's predecessor-in-interest constructed
a barbed wire fence ostensibly on the dividing line between the two
tracts. In 1987 Bell commissioned a survey, which purported to show
that his property extended beyond the fence line and onto the tract then
owned by the Owens Children. After Bell cut down trees beyond the
barbed wire fence, the Owens Children filed an action against him
seeking to establish ownership of the disputed land and seeking to
recover damages for the destruction of their fence and trees.26
At trial Bell argued that the Owens Children had failed to produce
any evidence that the barbed wire fence was actually constructed on the
true boundary between the two properties, and he filed a motion for
directed verdict on that basis. The trial court denied Bell's motion
and permitted the case to go to the jury.28 The jury found that the
fence was the boundary line between the two tracts and awarded the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

230 Ga. App. 826, 497 S.E.2d 591 (1998).
Id. at 826, 497 S.E.2d at 592.
Id.
Id.
Id.

28. Id.
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Owens Children actual and punitive damages against Bell.2 9 Bell
appealed the judgment entered on that verdict. 3°
The court of appeals concluded that the jury was authorized to find
the barbed wire fence represented the actual boundary between the two
tracts.3 In doing so, the court relied on O.C.G.A. section 44-4-6, which
provides two mechanisms for determining the location of a disputed
boundary line. 2 Under that statute, an "uncertain" or "unascertained"
boundary line may be established either by oral agreement, if the oral
agreement is accompanied by actual possession, or by acquiescence of the
parties in a mutually agreed boundary.33 The court stated that the
evidence regarding construction of the barbed wire fence and mutual
acceptance of that fence as the boundary line between the two properties
for approximately thirty years was sufficient to establish the boundary
line pursuant to section 44-4-6.' 4 Accordingly, the court of appeals
found that the trial court properly denied Bell's motion for directed
verdict and upheld entry of judgment based on the jury verdict.35

III. EASEMENTS
3

In McCorkle v. Morgan,' the Georgia Supreme Court stated unequivocally that a "parol license can be revoked where the licensee's enjoyment of the license was not preceded necessarily by the expenditure of
money.""7
In this case, Clifford E. Morgan, Sr. owned a tract of
commercial property located on the northeast corner of West Howard
Avenue and Atlanta Avenue. Mr. Morgan conveyed one portion of his
property to his daughter, defendant Barbara J. McCorkle, and the
remainder to his sons, Clifford E. Morgan, Jr. and James E. Morgan, Sr.
(the "Morgans"). Each tract contained a building from which the
respective transferees operated a business. The tract transferred to the
Morgans had no parking lot, therefore, they used the parking lot on
McCorkle's parcel for their customers. Additionally, the front door to the

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 827, 497 S.E.2d at 593.
32. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-4-6 (1991 & Supp. 1998)).
33. O.C.G.A. § 44-4-6.
34. 230 Ga. App. at 827, 497 S.E.2d at 593.
35. Id. The court also rejected Bell's argument that the'actual damages awarded to the
Owens Children were not supported by the evidence. Id. Finally, the court found that Bell
failed to preserve for appeal any error relating to the punitive damages award. Id. at 82728, 497 S.E.2d at 593-94.
36. 268 Ga. 730, 492 S.E.2d 891 (1997).
37. Id. at 730, 492 S.E.2d at 891.
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building on the Morgans' property was only a few feet from the boundary
with McCorkle's property. 8
In 1995 McCorkle notified the Morgans that they should cease using
the parking lot on McCorkle's property for their customers. Thereafter,
McCorkle constructed a chain link fence on the dividing line between the
two tracts. The fence effectively prevented customers from using the
parking lot on McCorkle's property in order to conduct business on the
Morgans' tract. 9
The Morgans filed an action against McCorkle asserting that they had
been granted a license to McCorkle's property and they had incurred
expenses in execution of that license. Therefore, they contended their
license had ripened into an easement running with the land. The
Morgans relied on O.C.G.A. section 44-9-4 to support their position.4 °
After a bench trial, the trial court rejected the Morgans' argument and
entered judgment allowing McCorkle to revoke the license. The Morgans
appealed.41
The supreme court stated that the undisputed evidence at trial showed
that the Morgans began using McCorkle's parking lot in 1977, and that
they used it for six years before incurring any expenses in connection
with maintaining the parking lot. 42 Because the Morgans had not been
required to "expend any money preceding their use of the parking lot,"
their interest in McCorkle's tract remained a parol license that was
revocable at McCorkle's will.43 Therefore, the court affirmed the trial
court's judgment in favor of McCorkle. 44 From the court's ruling in
McCorkle, it is clear that simply using a license, without expenditure of
money at the outset of that use, even for a long period of time, will not
convert a license into an easement.
In Givens v. Ichauway, Inc.,4 Ichauway, Inc. leased a parcel of land
through which the Ichauwaynochaway Creek flowed.
Ichauway
conducted ecological research on the creek. Givens owned property
upstream from Ichauway's leasehold and asserted the right to use the

38. Id. at 730-31, 492 S.E.2d at 892.
39. Id. at 730, 492 S.E.2d at 892.
40. Id. The provision reads as follows:
A parol license to another's land is revocable at any time if its revocation does no
harm to the person to whom it has been granted. A parol license is not revocable
when the licensee has acted pursuant thereto and in doing so has incurred
expenses; in such a case, it becomes an easement running with the land.
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4 (1982 & Supp. 1998).
41. 268 Ga. at 730-31, 492 S.E.2d at 892.
42. Id. at 731, 492 S.E.2d at 892.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 268 Ga. 710, 493 S.E.2d 148 (1997).
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stream (including sections within the boundary of Ichauway's leasehold).
Ichauway objected to Givens' use of the creek on its leasehold and filed
an action to enjoin Givens from trespassing on the creek. Givens
contended that because the creek was "navigable," he46had a right to float
down the creek through Ichauway's leased property.
The general rule in Georgia is that the owner or leaseholder of
property on both sides of a creek may "exclude others from the creek
unless the stream is navigable or some servitude exists."47 O.C.G.A.
section 44-8-5(a) states that to be navigable, a stream must be "capable
of transporting boats loaded with freight in the regular course of trade
either for the whole year or a part of the year. The mere rafting of
timber or transporting of wood in small boats shall not make a stream
navigable."4 '
Givens attempted to show that the Ichauway Creek was navigable by
floating a raft containing a goat, a bail of cotton, and two passengers
down the creek from his property through Ichauway's leasehold. A
hydroelectric dam crossed the creek on Ichauway's leasehold. However,
Givens was successful in navigating the stream on his raft by disassembling the craft above the dam, transporting it and his cargo by foot
around the dam, and reassembling the raft below the dam. Givens
asserted that his raft was similar to watercraft in use in the 19th
century. He also attempted to prove that the creek was once used for
commerce. In support of that position, Givens testified to anecdotal
stories from elder residents of the area.49 In rebuttal, Ichauway
presented expert testimony that the creek was incapable of supporting
commercial water traffic.5 ° At the close of discovery, Ichauway filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting that the undisputed evidence
established that Ichauway Creek was not "navigable" as a matter of
law.5 The trial court granted that motion, and Givens appealed.5 2
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment.5 3

46. Id. at 710, 493 S.E.2d at 150.
47. Id. at 711, 493 S.E.2d at 150 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 44-8-3, -5(b) (1982 & Supp. 1998);
Parker v. Durham, 258 Ga. 140, 365 S.E.2d 411 (1988); Bosworth v. Nelson, 172 Ga. 612,
158 S.E.2d 306 (1931); Bosworth v. Nelson, 170 Ga. 279, 152 S.E.2d 575 (1930)).
48. O.C.G.A. § 44-8-5(a) (1982 & Supp. 1998).
49. 268 Ga. at 711-12, 493 S.E.2d at 150-51.
50. Id. at 712, 493 S.E.2d at 151.
51. Id. at 712-13, 493 S.E.2d at 151.
52. Id. at 710, 493 S.E.2d at 150.
53. Id. at 715, 493 S.E.2d at 153.
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The supreme court rejected Givens's argument that his navigation of
the creek in his raft established navigability.54 The court found that
there was no evidence that watercraft like the one built by Givens had
ever been used in commerce on the creek.55 The court also refused to
consider Givens's testimony regarding past uses of the creek.5" His
testimony regarding lore from "old-timers" was deemed inadmissible
hearsay and Givens was held not qualified to render any expert opinion
testimony concerning commercial water transport.57 As a result, the
court found that the only admissible evidence before the trial court was
from Ichauway's expert who testified that the smallest craft normally in
commercial use in the area could not be used on Ichauway Creek.55
The court also rejected Givens's argument that a public right of
common passage existed with regard to the creek regardless of its
navigability. 59 In making that argument, Givens relied on a Georgia
Supreme Court opinion from 1849.60 In Young v. Harrison,"'the court
stated as follows:
Rivers are of three kinds: 1st. Such as are wholly and absolutely
private property. 2d. Such as are private property subject to the
servitude of the public interest, by a passage upon them. The distinguishing test between the two is, whether they are susceptible or not
of use for a common passage. 3rd. Rivers where the tide ebbs and
flows, which are called arms of the sea.62
Givens apparently argued that, because Ichauway Creek was neither
"wholly and absolutely private" nor an "arm of the sea," there must exist
6
a public right of passage on it. 3

In rejecting that argument, the court noted that, after entry of the
decision in Young, the Georgia Legislature adopted the Code of 1863,
which contained the definition of a "navigable stream which is currently
embodied in Section 44-8-5(a)."6 4 Because the "Code of 1863 was
intended to codify then existing law," the court found that the definition
of the types of streams contained in Young was subsumed within the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 713, 493 S.E.2d at 151.
Id. at 712, 493 S.E.2d at 151.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 713, 493 S.E.2d at 151-52.
Id. (quoting Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 130 (1849)).
6 Ga. 130 (1849).
Id. at 140-41.
268 Ga. at 713, 493 S.E.2d at 151-52.
Id., 493 S.E.2d at 152.
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definition contained in the Code.6 5 As a result, the court concluded
that "no servitude of public passage is imposed upon a stream unless it
is navigable under the Code."66 The court rejected Givens's appeal and
affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment.67
Two justices published a strong dissent to the majority's opinion.6 8
They began their opinion with the following statement:
This case is not about the ownership of the creek bed or the rights of
property owners adjacent to the creek. The issue in this case is
whether the public has a statutory or common law right to passage on
the Ichauwaynochaway Creek because it is, or was, capable of
navigation. The majority opinion misconstrues the statutory definition
of navigable stream under state law and ignores the public's right to
use interstate waterways under the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution.69
After making that statement, the dissenters pointed out what they
contended were two significant flaws with the majority's opinion.70
First, the dissenters noted that summary judgment had never before
been granted in a case concerning navigability of a stream.7' According
to the dissenters, that issue was peculiarly one that should be resolved
after full development of facts afforded by a trial.7 2 Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the dissenters opined that the majority erred
in failing to consider whether Ichauway Creek was navigable under
federal law.73 The dissent stated that the issue of navigability is a
federal question because the waters of Ichauway Creek flow into the
Flint River and eventually into the Apalachicola River.74 Because the
creek could be followed all the way to the Gulf of Mexico, it necessarily
was part of the interstate waterway and is subject to applicable federal
law. 75 Rather than affirming the trial court the dissenters would have

remanded in order for the trial court to decide questions of fact
regarding navigability
of the Ichauway Creek under both Georgia law
76
and federal law.

65.

Id.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 715, 493 S.E.2d at 153.
68. Id. at 715-20, 493 S.E.2d 153-57 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 715, 493 S.E.2d at 153.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 720, 493 S.E.2d at 156.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 157.
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CONDEMNATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN

In Hulsey v. Department of Transportation," the court considered for
the first time when the "date of taking" occurred in the context of an
inverse condemnation.7" The Hulsey case arose out of construction of
a four-lane highway by the Department of Transportation ("DOT") in
Polk County, Georgia. In October 1990 the DOT contracted with Wright
Brothers Construction Company to build a 2.3 mile portion of the
highway. The construction commenced in early 1991. The highway was
built through very hilly terrain and across valleys that contained
streams flowing into a nearby ten acre lake. Hulsey and the other
plaintiffs owned the lake. 9
Plaintiffs filed an action against the DOT for inverse condemnation,
seeking to recover compensation for damage to their property that they
alleged resulted from the DOT's construction of the highway. Plaintiffs
complained that rainwater runoff from the construction site deposited
silt into and damaged their lake. They testified that prior to construction of the highway the lake was usually clear. However, once construction of the highway commenced, the lake became "muddy" each time it
rained. Plaintiffs also presented the testimony of an engineer who
opined that the siltation in the lake resulted from the DOT's construction of the highway."0 In late 1995 the DOT completed construction of
the highway and erected permanent structures to prevent silt from
sliding into plaintiffs' lake. However, according to plaintiffs' expert, by
October 1995 the DOT's activities had resulted in approximately 20,000
cubic yards of silt being deposited in plaintiffs' lake."
Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony from an appraiser regarding
the value of their property as of January 24, 1991 and again as of
October 1, 1995. Based on those two appraisals, plaintiffs' expert
concluded that the siltation of the lake resulted in a depreciation in the
value of plaintiffs' property of forty-five percent to fifty percent.82 At
the close of plaintiffs' testimony, the trial court directed a verdict against
plaintiffs on the basis that they had failed to establish a date of the

77. 230 Ga. App. 763, 498 S.E.2d 122 (1998).
78. Id. at 763, 498 S.E.2d at 122.
79. Id., 498 S.E.2d at 124. Included in the case were two plaintiffs who a owned a
parcel of land adjacent to the subject lake. However, because they did not own a portion
of the lake, their claims were dismissed by the trial court. Although they were parties to
the appeal, their claims were dismissed summarily by the appellate court and do not
warrant discussion. Id. at 763-65, 498 S.E.2d at 124-25.
80. Id. at 763-64, 498 S.E.2d at 124-25.
81. Id. at 764, 498 S.E.2d at 125.
82. Id.
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alleged taking by the DOT.8 3 Plaintiffs appealed from that directed
84
verdict.
As the appellate court noted, the "date of taking" in direct condemnation cases is "the date on which compensation is tendered or paid to the
landowner." 5 However, in inverse condemnation actions, the public
entity generally disputes that a taking has occurred and does not
voluntarily offer to pay compensation to the plaintiff. 6 As a result,
there is no clearly identifiable date for measuring a plaintiff's damages
in such cases. The court also found that there was no prior Georgia
authority establishing the "means for determining the 'date of taking' in
inverse condemnation cases.""
Because of the lack of Georgia authority, the court looked to cases
decided in other jurisdictions.88 The court found those courts had held
that the date on which the impact on the affected property "stabilized"
was the date of taking.89 The date of stabilization is determined by the
"point in time when the damaging activity has reached a level which
substantially interferes with the owner's use and enjoyment of his
property.' 9 ° The court adopted that same reasoning for Georgia.9
The court stated that by using the date on which the damage has "stabilized," the parties may avoid piecemeal litigation by permitting the
landowner to "evaluate the full extent of the damage to his or her
property and the amount of compensation
necessary to redress the
92
damage" before commencing litigation.
Using the date of stabilization as the date of taking in Hulsey, the
court held that sufficient evidence did exist for plaintiffs' case to be
presented to the jury.93 The court concluded that the DOT's construc-

83. Id. at 763, 498 S.E.2d at 124. Plaintiffs had also asserted a claim against the
DOT's contractor based on alleged negligence in performing the clearing and grading
activities. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of
negligence by the DOT's contractor and granted directed verdict in its favor as well. Id.
at 766-67, 498 S.E.2d at 126-27. That decision was upheld on appeal. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 765, 498 S.E.2d at 125-26 (citing DeKalb County v. Daniels, 174 Ga. App.
319, 329 S.E.2d 620 (1985)).
86. Id. at 765-66, 498 S.E.2d at 126.
87. Id. at 766, 498 S.E.2d at 126.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing 4 Nichols on Emiment Domain (MB) § 12A.02, at 12A-5 (June 1998).
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); Smart v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
90. Id. (quoting Smart, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 176).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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tion was substantially complete in the latter part of 1995 and that the
DOT took steps at that time to prevent further damage to plaintiffs' lake
by constructing permanent siltation stops.94 From that, the jury could
have concluded the damage to plaintiffs' property had stabilized in late
1995. Accordingly, the evidence of the appraisal of plaintiffs' property
as of October 1, 1995 provided "some evidence" of the damages on the
date of taking.9"
Plaintiffs who seek to recover damages based on inverse condemnation
should consider carefully how the holding in Hulsey affects their cases.
The date that damages have "stabilized" will likely be an issue of fact to
which no firm rule may apply. It is clearly an issue that plaintiffs
should discuss with their expert witnesses and which should be taken
into consideration when assessing the date for appraisal of the affected
property.
The dispute in Department of Transportation v. Bridges96 arose out
of closure by the DOT of Chumley Circle at its intersection with Canton
Road in Cobb County. Bridges owned a tract of land zoned for commercial use that abutted Chumley Circle near its intersection with Canton
Road. The DOT's closing of Chumley Circle did not result in a physical
taking of any part of Bridges's property and did not diminish Bridges's
access to Chumley Circle. However, it did lengthen the route that
Bridges had to follow to reach Canton Road from his property, and
required that Bridges travel through residential streets to reach Canton
Road. Bridges filed an action against the DOT to recover the diminution
in the value of his property that he claimed would result from the
change in his access to Canton Road.97
The DOT moved for summary judgment against Bridges, contending
that Bridges suffered no compensable taking and could not recover
damages as a matter of law.98 The trial court denied that motion and
the DOT appealed.99 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court.'0° The DOT petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals decision conflicted
with two prior court of appeals decisions.'

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 268 Ga. 258, 486 S.E.2d 593 (1997).
97. Id. at 258, 486 S.E.2d at 593-94.
98. Department of Transportation v. Bridges, 222 Ga. App. 19, 473 S.E.2d 765 (1996).
99. Id. at 19, 473 S.E.2d at 765.
100. Id.
101. 268 Ga. at 258, 486 S.E.2d at 593 (citing Tift County v. Smith, 219 Ga. 68, 131
S.E.2d 527 (1963); DOT v. Durpo, 220 Ga. App. 458, 469 S.E.2d 404 (1996)).
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The supreme court concluded that Bridges was not entitled to recover
the damages he alleged and reversed the decisions of the lower
courts.1" 2 The court stated that the rights of property owners "'fall into
two categories: general rights, which [the landowner has] in common
with the public, and special rights, which [the landowner holds] by
virtue of ... ownership of [the] property."'' 1 3 However, only a public
taking or damaging of the landowner's "special rights" is compensable.'0 4 The court stated that Bridges's access to the public road abutting his property (i.e., Chumley Circle) had not been changed by the
DOT's action, and that Bridges only complained of the inconvenience he
now faced in reaching Canton Road.0 5 The court concluded that the
inconvenience did not affect a special right because the public in general
shared that inconvenience." The fact that Bridges might suffer more
inconvenience than the remainder of the 1general
public did not create a
07
cause of action for him against the DOT.
The supreme court expressly rejected an argument that had convinced
a majority of the court of appeals that questions of fact remained
concerning Bridges's possible recovery."'
Bridges argued that his
property was "unique" because of its convenient access to Canton Road
prior to the closure of the Chumley Circle intersection. He contended
that he was entitled to be compensated for the loss of that unique aspect
of his property.0 9 However, as the supreme court noted, the fact that
a property, which is taken is "unique" does not create a cause of action
itself; rather the "uniqueness" merely provides for an enhancement of
the damages that a property owner may recover."0 The supreme court
reversed the court of appeals, resulting in entry ofjudgment for the DOT
in the trial court as a matter of law.1 '
In Department of Transportation v. Woods,"' the supreme court
reversed a court of appeals decision that was discussed in last year's

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 259, 486 S.E.2d at 594.
Id. at 258, 486 S.E.2d at 594 (quoting Smith, 219 Ga. at 72, 131 S.E.2d at 529).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260, 486 S.E.2d at 594. Another case was decided by the Georgia Court of

Appeals during the survey period that involved nearly an identical issue to that decided
in Bridges. See Eastside Properties v. DOT, 231 Ga. App. 217, 498 S.E.2d 769 (1998)
(regarding what constitutes a "taking" through a change in traffic patterns or street
access).
112, 269 Ga. 53, 494 S.E.2d 507 (1998).
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survey.113 In this case, the DOT filed a condemnation petition against
property owned by Woods and deposited $76,000 into the court's registry
as "just and adequate" compensation. That assessment of the fair
market value of Woods's property was based on an affidavit from the
DOT's appraiser. During the course of discovery in the underlying case,
the DOT's appraiser increased to $90,000 his estimate of the condemned
property's fair market value. However, the DOT did not increase the
amount of its deposit in the court's registry. At the conclusion of a fourday jury trial, the jury awarded $162,000 as compensation for the taking
of his property. Thereafter, Woods filed a motion seeking to recover his
attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14."1 The trial court denied
that motion,
finding that section 9-15-14 did not apply in condemnation
5
cases.

11

Woods appealed that decision and the court of appeals reversed."'
The court concluded that the reference in section 9-15-14 to an award of
attorney fees "in any civil case" rendered that statute applicable in
condemnation cases.'17 Based on the facts of the case, the court
remanded Woods's motion for consideration by the trial court."'
The supreme court granted the DOT's petition for a writ of certiorari
and reversed the lower court's decision. 19 Importantly, the supreme
court agreed with the court of appeals that attorney fees could be
awarded in condemnation cases under section 9-15-14.2o In upholding
that portion of the lower court's ruling, the supreme court followed much
the same reasoning.' 2' The court agreed that the reference in section
9-15-14 to "any civil action" in the context of Georgia's Takings Clause
clearly was intended to apply in condemnation cases.' 2 2
The supreme court disagreed, however, with the court of appeals
decision to remand the case to the trial court.'23 The court found,
instead, that no evidence existed to support an award of attorney fees as

113. Id. at 56, 494 S.E.2d at 510. See T. Daniel Brannan & William J. Sheppard, Real
Property, 49 MERCER L. REV. 257, 277-78 (1997) (citing Woods v. DOT, 225 Ga. App. 29,
482 S.E.2d 396 (1997)).
114. 269 Ga. at 53, 494 S.E.2d at 508.
115. Id. at 53-54, 494 S.E.2d at 508.
116. Id. (citing Woods v. DOT, 225 Ga. App. 29, 482 S.E.2d 396 (1997)). The basis of
the court of appeals decision is detailed in last year's survey. See T. Daniel Brannan &
William J. Sheppard, Real Property, 49 MERCER L. REV. 257, 277-78 (1997).
117. 225 Ga. App. at 30-31, 482 S.E.2d at 397.
118. Id. at 31, 494 S.E.2d at 398.
119. 269 Ga. at 56, 494 S.E.2d at 510.
120. Id. at 54-55, 494 S.E.2d at 508-09.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 56, 494 S.E.2d at 509-10.
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a matter of law.'24 First, the supreme court determined that Woods
was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under the mandatory
language of section 9-15-14(a). 125 Because the DOT's initial deposit
into the court's registry was based on the opinion of a qualified
appraiser, the supreme court concluded that the DOT's position was not
"void of 'any justiciable ...

fact, [such] that it could not be reasonably

12
believed that a court would accept [it].'"'
The supreme court also concluded that no evidence existed to support
an award of attorney fees under the discretionary provision of section 915-14(b). 127 The court concluded that the evidence before the trial
court demonstrated that the DOT's position "neither lacked 'substantial
justification,' nor evidenced 'improper conduct.'' 128 Again, the court
found significant the fact that the DOT's initial deposit of funds into the
trial court's registry was based on the opinion of a qualified appraiser. 29 Additionally, the supreme court noted that Woods's claim
regarding the fair market value of his property was more than double
the amount the jury awarded him.' ° The court concluded that
Woods's argument that the DOT's estimate was interposed for purposes
of harassment and delay was discredited.'
In short, 3the
supreme
2
court found no evidence of improper conduct by the DOT.
Although the supreme court's decision in Woods affirmed that section
9-15-14 does apply in condemnation cases, the impact of that ruling may
be limited by the ultimate outcome in the case. It appears that as long

124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 55-56, 494 S.E.2d at 509. Subsection (a) of the statute states that attorney

fees:
shall be awarded to any party against whom another party has asserted a claim,
defense, or other position with respect to which there existed such a complete
absence of any justifiable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably
believed that a court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
126. 269 Ga. at 55, 494 S.E.2d at 509 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a)).
127. Id. at 56, 494 S.E.2d at 509-10. Subsection (b) of the statute states that a:
court may assess reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation in any civil action in any court of record if, upon the motion of any party
or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action,
or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification or that the action, or any
part thereof, was interposed for delay or harassment, or if it finds that an attorney
or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct ....
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (1993 & Supp. 1998).

128. Id. at 56, 494 S.E.2d at 510.
129. Id., 494 S.E.2d at 509.
130.
131.
132.

Id., 494 S.E.2d at 510.
Id.
Id.
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as the DOT's initial offer of compensation to the owners of property
taken for public use is based on the opinion of a qualified expert, the fact
that the jury ultimately awards a substantially larger figure likely will
never support a claim for attorney fees. Therefore, the court's decision
creates a "safe harbor" for the DOT and other condemning authorities to
govern their procedures in the future.
V.

PURCHASE CONTRACTS AND BROKERS

In Simmons v. Pilkenton,'33 defendant advertised for sale a tract of
land as containing 1.5 acres. Plaintiff contracted to purchase the
property for three thousand dollars and executed a promissory note in
favor of defendant for the purchase price. The description of the
property in the contract executed between the parties referenced a
recorded plat. After making improvements to the property and placing
a trailer on it, plaintiff was advised that the property was smaller than
the advertised 1.5 acres and, under an applicable county ordinance, was
not large enough for a trailer. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an action
against the seller for fraud, seeking, among other things, to rescind the
contract. The seller counterclaimed
and asserted a claim based on a
1 4
default under the promissory note.
At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered in favor of
plaintiff.'35 Defendant was ordered to return plaintiffs purchase
money with interest at the legal rate and to pay plaintiff the value of
improvements made to the property. 3 6 The court also denied defendant's counterclaim for recovery under the promissory note.3 7 Defendant appealed and the trial court's decision was reversed on appeal. 3 '
The court of appeals concluded that plaintiff failed to establish an
essential element of his fraud claim, namely reasonable reliance. 3 s
The court stated that the plat referenced in the property description
attached to the contract identified the property as containing "approximately .80 acres, which clearly was less than the 1.5 acres" advertised

133. 230 Ga. App. 900, 497 S.E.2d 613 (1998).
134. Id. at 900-02, 497 S.E.2d at 615-16. The case arose in an unusual procedural
context. Initially, plaintiff filed his action to rescind the sales contract in the magistrate
court in Webster County. Plaintiff prevailed before the magistrate court and defendant
appealed for a de novo trial in the superior court. At the time defendant asserted his
appeal, he also filed his counterclaim on the promissory note. Id. at 900, 497 S.E.2d-at
615.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 901, 494 S.E.2d at 615.
139. Id.
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by defendant.14
The court opined that had plaintiff reviewed the
contract in anything other than a cursory manner he would have
discovered the reference to the recorded plat and "could have avoided all
of his woes by simply demanding to see the plat before executing the
contract."'
Because plaintiff failed to exercise that minimal degree
of diligence to protect himself, the court concluded that he was unable
to establish a valid claim for fraud in the inducement.' 42 This decision
underscores the need for purchasers of property to perform sufficient due
diligence to protect themselves from defects that could have been
discovered from recorded land records.
The court of appeals in Padgett v. City of Moultrie" resolved an
issue of first impression concerning what activities and services may
support a broker's lien under the Georgia Commercial Real Estate
Broker Lien Act (the "Act").'" Padgett had entered into an agreement
to facilitate the purchase of property in downtown Moultrie by Cambridge Health Care Services. The services Padgett provided included the
following: "[T]he negotiation and arrangement of the purchase of the
hotel property, obtaining financing from both Empire [Financial Service]
and from the City [of Moultrie], site analysis, market feasibility studies,
assisting the architect and contractor in renovation of the property, and
managing the property after closing. " 145 In exchange for those services, Cambridge agreed to pay Padgett $100,000. Additionally, Padgett
was to receive from Cambridge a real estate commission equal to five
percent of the purchase price of the property. At the closing, there were
insufficient funds available to pay all of Padgett's real estate commission
and the $100,000 fee. Cambridge paid the commission, and part of the
$100,000 fee was paid at closing, and the parties executed a written
"commission agreement" covering the balance of $55,420. When
Cambridge failed to pay that sum, Padgett filed a lien against the
property
and later commenced an action seeking to foreclose on that
146
lien.

Padgett named the City of Moultrie and Empire as defendants in her
action on the basis that they held security deeds on the property that
was subject to Padgett's lien. 47 Empire and the City filed motions for

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 902, 494 S.E.2d at 616.
Id.
Id.
229 Ga. App. 500, 494 S.E.2d 299 (1997).
Id. at 500, 494 S.E.2d at 300.
Id. at 501, 494 S.E.2d at 300.
Id.
Id. at 500, 494 S.E.2d at 300.
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summary judgment asserting that Padgett did not have a valid broker's
lien. 14' They argued that the services Padgett performed on behalf of
Cambridge were not "licensed services" under the Act and did not
support filing of the lien by Padgett. 4 1 Padgett filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment arguing that her lien was valid and enforceable as
a matter of law. 5 ° The trial court denied Padgett's motion and
granted summary judgment in favor of the City and Empire. 5 '
Padgett appealed both decisions, and the court of appeals reversed.'52
In reaching its decision, the court first attempted to define what
services and activities would support a lien under the Act. 53 The
court noted that the reference to services in the statute was not limited
to "licensed services." 15 4 In fact, the court stated that the term only
appeared in subsection (a)(2) of the lien statute.'5 5 The court pointed
out that "a lien [arises] not only for compensation '[a]rising out of a
listing agreement' but also 'any other agreement for the management,
sale, or lease of or otherwise conveying any interest in the commercial
real estate.'"'56 The court concluded, therefore, that "the General
Assembly did not intend to limit a commercial real estate broker's lien
strictly to licensed services." "57
'
The court then considered whether the services Padgett provided to
Cambridge in this case were properly secured by a lien against the
subject property.'5 8 First, the court stated that the three subsections
contained in O.C.G.A. section 44-14-602(a) must be read disjunctively."' 9 As a result, Padgett was required to show only that her lien fell
within the ambit of one of the three subsections. 60 The court concluded that the written agreement between Padgett and Cambridge satisfied
the provisions of section 44-14-602(a)(3) and that Padgett provided
services resulting in the procuring of a ready, willing, and able buyer
under section 44-14-602(a)(2).' 6' Further, the court concluded that

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 501, 494 S.E.2d at 300-01.
Id. at 500, 494 S.E.2d at 300.
Id.
Id. at 501, 494 S.E.2d at 300.
Id. at 502, 494 S.E.2d at 301.
Id. at 503, 494 S.E.2d at 301.
Id.
Id., 494 S.E.2d at 301-02 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-14-602(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1998)).
Id. at 504, 494 S.E.2d at 302.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161.

Id.
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there was no dispute regarding the amount of Padgett's lien.'62
Specifically, the testimony from Cambridge's chief executive officer
established the amount of the agreed upon compensation.' 63 Based on
its findings, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, resulting in the
entry of summary judgment in favor of Padgett and against the City and
Empire.'6'
The holding in Padgett is significant for real estate brokers and
salespersons in that it clarifies the bases on which they will be entitled
to assert liens under the Act. It is now clear that real estate brokers
may secure payment of services that are ancillary to their involvement
in the sale or lease of properties as brokers through the assertion of a
lien. The holding in Padgett should also serve as a warning to purchasers of commercial real estate. Some investigation must be made
regarding potential agreements between the seller and their broker
beyond a simple inquiry into the existence of listing agreements for the
property.
VI.

FORECLOSURES

The issue in Quattlebaum v. Ameribank, N.A.' 5 arose out of Ameribank's attempts to confirm a foreclosure sale of property securing a loan.
Robert Quattlebaum had personally guaranteed the loan. Ameribank
foreclosed on the property securing the loan and sought to confirm that
sale in order to pursue a deficiency against Quattlebaum.'6 6 An order
was entered by the trial court confirming the foreclosure sale on
September 12, 1994.167 However, the trial court later set aside a
portion of that order, which stated that Quattlebaum was personally
served with notice of the confirmation hearing and was, therefore,
subject to an action for deficiency by Ameribank. 16
A second hearing was scheduled for May 20, 1996 for the purpose of
confirming the foreclosure sale as it related to Quattlebaum. Ameri-

162. Id.
163. Id. at 501, 504, 494 S.E.2d at 300, 302.
164. Id. at 506, 494 S.E.2d at 304. Also at issue before the court of appeals was the
relative priority of Padgett's lien in relation to the liens held by Empire and the City.
While Padgett's lien was recorded after, and normally would be primed by Empire's
security deed for the property, the court concluded that Padgett's broker's lien was first
in priority. Id. at 505-06, 494 S.E.2d at 303-04. That resulted from Empire's agreement
to subordinate its lien to a security deed in favor of the City, which was filed after
Padgett's broker's lien. Id.
165. 227 Ga. App. 517, 489 S.E.2d 319 (1997).
166. Id. at 517, 489 S.E.2d at 320.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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bank's lawyers served a document entitled "Notice of Hearing" on
Quattlebaum, informing him of the date of the hearing and attaching a
copy of the confirmation application. Neither the Notice of Hearing nor
the confirmation petition named Quattlebaum as a party. The notice
ended with the following
language: "'You are invited, but not required,
' 169
to attend the hearing. "

Quattlebaum appeared at the confirmation hearing with counsel and
asserted objections to the hearing taking place. Quattlebaum argued that
the notice he received of the hearing did not comply with the require:
ments of the Georgia confirmation statute. 7 ° The trial court rejected
each of Quattlebaum's objections and confirmed the foreclosure sale,
finding that the price bid at the sale "'was within the range shown by
[the] evidence as the true market value.' ,'7

Quattlebaum appealed and the appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision. 72 In so ruling, the court of appeals found two deficiencies in the notice to Quattlebaum. 7 First, Quattlebaum was not
named as a party in the confirmation petition.7 4 Relying on the
holding from First National Bank v. Kunes175 and a strict construction
of the confirmation statute, the court found that the failure to name
Quattlebaum as a party rendered the notice defective. 76 Second, the
court found the form of the notice defective. 177 As explained in a
concurring opinion, O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161(c) contemplates that "the
court shall direct that a notice of the hearing shall be given to the

169. Id. The court's judgment confirming the foreclosure sale as it related to the
principal debtor was affirmed on appeal by the Georgia Court of Appeals. See Ameribank,
N.A. v. Quattlebaum, 220 Ga. App. 345, 469 S.E.2d 462 (1995).
170. 227 Ga. App. at 517-18, 489 S.E.2d at 321-22. Quattlebaum also raised an
objection on the basis that the trial court had no authority to hold the second confirmation
hearing and that the two year delay between the foreclosure sale and the second
confirmation hearing unfairly prevented him from opposing the confirmation. The court
rejected both arguments. Id., 489 S.E.2d at 321. The appellate court stated that the trial
court was "required to disregard its prior confirmation order and consider anew the issue
of whether the incumbent property sold fairly." Id. at 518, 489 S.E.2d at 321. The court
also stated that evidentiary concerns created by the time lag between a foreclosure sale
and the confirmation hearing were "unavoidable" and were to be taken into consideration
by the trial court in deciding whether or not to confirm the sale. Id.
171. Id. at 517, 489 S.E.2d at 321.
172. Id. at 519, 489 S.E.2d at 322.
173. Id. at 518, 489 S.E.2d at 321.
174. Id.
175. 128 Ga. App. 565, 197 S.E.2d 446, affd 230 Ga. 888, 199 S.E.2d 776 (1973).
176. 227 Ga. App. at 518, 489 S.E.2d at 321.
177. Id.
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debtor."7 ' In order to comply with the statute, notice must be in the
form of a rule nisi or some other form as directed by the court. 7 9 The
court found that requirement to be consistent with the court's authority
to supervise confirmation hearings.' 80 Such a procedure permits the
court to ensure that "the notice is adequate and proper at the outset"
and permits the debtor an opportunity to prepare for the issues involved
in a confirmation hearing.81 The notice in this case was not a rule
nisi; it came solely from Ameribank's counsel without any direction from
the court.8 2 Therefore, the court found the notice insufficient as a
matter of law.'
Interestingly, that decision was reached despite the
fact that Quattlebaum had received actual notice, appeared at the
confirmation hearing with counsel, and presented an expert witness that
contradicted the testimony presented by Ameribank.5 4 The court
concluded that, in
confirmation hearings, there was no provision for
18 5
"harmless error."
The court in Oakvale Road Associates, Ltd. v. Mortgage Recovery
Fund-Atlanta Pools, L.P.86 considered an issue that has been discussed in the surveys for the last two years. Specifically, the court
considered whether failure to confirm a foreclosure sale of real estate
given to secure one debt precluded recovery of a deficiency following sale
of real property given by the same creditor to secure a separate debt to
the same creditor.'8 7 In this case, Oakvale Road Associates, Ltd.
("Oakvale") executed a promissory note to Southern Federal Savings &
Loan Association in the face amount of $480,000. As security for the
loan, Oakvale executed security deeds for three contiguous tracts of
land-the Oakvale Heights Subdivision, the Broad Oak Court Subdivision, and the "Undeveloped Land." Eleven months later, Oakvale

178. Id. at 519, 489 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(c) (1982 & Supp. 1998)
(emphasis added)).
179. Id. The court did not rule that the only notice that would comply with the Georgia
confirmation statute is a rule nisi and specifically left the issue that some other form of
notice might comply. However, it is clear that a rule nisi always will comply with statutory
requirements for notice. Id. at 519 n.2, 489 S.E.2d at 322 n.2 (Beasley, J., concurring
specially).
180. Id. at 520, 489 S.E.2d at 322.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 519, 489 S.E.2d at 322.
183. Id. at 520-21, 489 S.E.2d at 323.
184. Id. at 521, 489 S.E.2d at 323.
185. Id.
186. 231 Ga. App. 414, 499 S.E.2d 404 (1998).
187. Id. at 414-15, 499 S.E.2d at 405. See T. Daniel Brannan, Real Property, 48
MERCER L. REV. 455, 482-84 (1996); T. Daniel Brannan & William J. Sheppard, Real
Property, 49 MERCER L. REV. 257, 273-76 (1997).
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borrowed another $195,000 from Southern Federal for the development
of individual lots in Broad Oak Court. A separate note was executed for
that amount. In connection with that transaction, Southern Federal
released its prior security interest in the Broad Oak Court property.
However, Oakvale executed a second security deed to Southern Federal
for the Broad Oak Court property and granted Southern Federal a
second priority security interest in the Undeveloped Land. Southern
Federal later transferred both notes and security deeds to Mortgage
Recovery."'
When Oakvale defaulted on both notes, Mortgage Recovery declared
the full amount of the indebtedness due and sent Oakvale notices of
acceleration of the debts. Mortgage Recovery also gave notice of its
intent to foreclose on the property securing the debts. Mortgage
Recovery subsequently foreclosed on the first security deed by selling
Oakvale Heights and the Undeveloped Land for the amount due on the
note. Mortgage Recovery did not attempt to confirm the sale of those
properties. Mortgage Recovery also sold the Broad Oak Court property
at foreclosure to recover under the second note. Unlike the sale of the
Oakvale Heights property and the Undeveloped Land, the sale of the
Broad Oak property resulted in a deficiency on the second note of
$72,691.61. Mortgage Recovery sought to confirm the second sale and
thereby preserve its right to pursue the deficiency against Oakvale.' 89
On application by Mortgage Recovery, a judgment was entered
confirming the second foreclosure sale.'
Oakvale appealed. On
appeal, Oakvale argued that Mortgage Recovery's failure to confirm the
foreclosure sale under the first security deed precluded recovery of a
deficiency under the second note.' 9 ' Oakvale argued that the debts
represented by the two notes in this case were "inextricably intertwined"
so that failure to confirm the first foreclosure sale precluded recovery of
a deficiency following the second.' 92
The court of appeals agreed with Oakvale and reversed the trial
court's judgment.'93 The court stated that debts are generally considered "inextricably intertwined" when they "are incurred for the same
purpose, secured by the same property, held by the same creditor and
owed by the same debtor." 94 In this case, the court found that

188. 231 Ga. App. at 415, 499 S.E.2d at 405.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 415-16, 499 S.E.2d at 405-06.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 419, 499 S.E.2d at 408.
194. Id. at 416, 499 S.E.2d at 406 (citing Tufts v. Levin, 213 Ga. App. 35, 443 S.E.2d
681 (1994)).
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although Oakvale's two notes were executed almost a year apart and for
different purposes, they remained "inextricably intertwined" for purposes
of confirmation of a foreclosure sale and an action for a deficiency.195
The court based its decision on the fact that the Undeveloped Land
served as security for both notes.'9 6 The court specifically rejected
Mortgage Recovery's argument that the security for both notes was
required to be "wholly identical" property in order to preclude Mortgage
Recovery's attempts to recover a deficiency under the second note.'97
The court held that Mortgage Recovery's position "would disserve the
purpose of the confirmation statute, which is to assure fairness to the
debtor and avert a windfall to the creditor."'98 Accordingly, the court
of appeals ruled as a matter of law that Mortgage Recovery was
precluded from obtaining a deficiency against Oakvale under the second
note.' 99
VII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

In Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G.Spanos Realty Partners,L.P,2 00 the
Georgia Supreme Court had its first opportunity to apply a recently
announced approach in Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker'' to
determine whether a landlord is liable to a tenant injured in a criminal
attack.2"' Plaintiff-appellant was raped and robbed in the parking
garage beneath her apartment building. Prior to the attack on plaintiff,
other crimes against property had occurred in the parking garage.
Those crimes included the theft of bicycles and thefts from automobiles.
The owner and manager of the apartments, Prudential-Bache and A.G.
Spanos Development, Inc., respectively, had notice of those prior
criminal acts. Plaintiff filed an action against the owner and manager
alleging that they negligently failed to maintain the safety of the
premises. 203
Defendants denied liability and asserted that the prior property crimes
were insufficient to put them on notice of the potential for crimes
resulting in personal injury.2 4 The trial court granted defendants'

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 416-19, 499 S.E.2d at 406-08.
Id. at 417-18, 499 S.E.2d at 407.
Id.
Id. at 418, 499 S.E.2d at 407.
Id. at 419, 499 S.E.2d at 408.
268 Ga. 604, 492 S.E.2d 865 (1997).
267 Ga. 785, 482 S.E.2d 339 (1997).
268 Ga. at 604, 492 S.E.2d at 866.
Id.
Id.
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motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed." 5
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals "relied solely on the
principle that prior property crimes could not create a factual issue
regarding whether a property owner knew or should have known that a
crime against a person, sexual or otherwise, might be committed on its
The supreme court granted certiorari to determine
premises."2"6
whether the court of appeals decision comported with the recently stated
principle from Sturbridge Partners."7
The court began its analysis with a statement concerning the general
obligation of landlords to protect tenants from "foreseeable" criminal
attacks.20 ' However, the court noted that in Sturbridge Partners it
rejected a "restrictive and inflexible approach" for determining which
criminal acts were foreseeable.20 9 In that case, the court stated: "In
determining whether previous criminal acts are substantially similar to
the occurrence causing harm, thereby establishing the foreseeability of
risk, the court must inquire into the location, nature and extent of prior
criminal activities and their likeness, proximity or other relationship to
the crime in question."2 10 The court noted that in order to create a
reasonable foreseeability of future criminal activity, the prior incidents
are not required to be identical to the act in question.211 However, the
prior criminal acts must "'be sufficient to attract the [landlord's]
attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated
[incident].' 2 2 In Sturbridge Partners the court concluded that the
question of reasonable foreseeability was generally a jury question.213
After analyzing the facts presented in the current case under the
holding in Sturbridge Partners,the court concluded that the trial court's
grant of summary judgment was proper.21 4' The court held that the
prior property thefts did not suggest that personal injury would occur if
further thefts took place.2 5 The court placed great emphasis on the
fact that all the crimes occurred in a common area of the apartment
building where "there is only the potential for a tenant to confront a

205. Id.
206. Id. at 604-05, 492 S.E.2d at 866 (citing Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G. Spanos
Realty Partners, 222 Ga. App. 169, 171-72, 474 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1996)).
207. Id. at 604, 492 S.E.2d at 866.
208. Id. at 605, 492 S.E.2d at 866.
209. Id.
210. Sturbridge Partners,267 Ga. at 786, 482 S.E.2d at 341.
211. 268 Ga. at 605, 492 S.E.2d at 867.
212. Id. (citing SturbridgePartners,267 Ga. at 786, 482 S.E.2d at 339).
213. 267 Ga. at 787, 482 S.E.2d at 341.
214. 268 Ga. at 606, 492 S.E.2d at 867.
215. Id.
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thief in an isolated situation" and "there is always the possibility that
the isolation could be brief."11 6 In contrast, the crimes against property in Sturbridge Partnersoccurred in individual apartment units where
the victims were more likely to be isolated with the criminal.217
Accordingly, the court concluded that the prior crimes against property
in this case were "insufficient to create a factual issue regarding whether
[the owner] could reasonably anticipate that a violent sexual assault
might occur on the premises."21
Justice Hunstein wrote a dissenting opinion that was strongly critical
of the majority.1 9 She suggested that the majority opinion only gave
"lip service to holding in Sturbridge [Partners],"and then proceeded "to
usurp the jury's role by i esolving contested factual conflicts" in order to
achieve a desired result--"a return to 'restrictive and inflexible' standard
of the 'substantially similar' prior criminal act" that was rejected in
22 °
Sturbridge Partners.
Justice Hunstein acknowledged that plaintiff
might have a relatively weak case.2" However, she opined that the
"mere recognition of the weakness of appellant's case does not entitle the
majority to play factfinder and enter summary adjudication for appellees
in a case where the evidence does not, with plain and palpable facts,
establish the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's
case."222 Justice Hunstein stated that she would reverse the trial
court's entry of judgment as a matter of law and remand so that the jury
could resolve factual disputes regarding the foreseeability of the crimes
against plaintiff in this case.223
The authors tend to agree with Justice Hunstein's analysis of the
Prudential-Bachecase. If the holding from SturbridgePartnersmeans
anything, it is that the question of foreseeability of a tenant's injuries
from the criminal acts of third parties is generally a jury question. Only
in the most patent cases, when the plaintiff fails to present any evidence
that would suggest the crime at issue was foreseeable, would summary
adjudication in favor of the property owner be appropriate. As a result
of the court's decision in Prudential-Bache,the issue of foreseeability in
these situations will likely result in substantial litigation and numerous
appeals in the coming years. Practitioners from both the plaintiffs and

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 607, 492 S.E.2d at 868 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 608, 492 S.E.2d at 868.
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defense bar should closely follow the development of this area and assess
for themselves the ultimate effect of the supreme court's decision in
Sturbridge Partners.
VIII.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The Georgia Legislature passed two significant acts affecting the law
of real property in Georgia during its 1998 session. The first act made
several revisions to the practice and procedure in dispossessory
proceedings.224 First, the legislature amended O.C.G.A. section 44-752, which granted tenants an absolute defense in a dispossessory
proceeding through the tender of the rent allegedly owed plus the cost
of a dispossessory warrant. The amendment added subsections (b) and
(c) to the existing statute. Those subsections state as follows:
(b) If the court finds that the tenant is entitled to prevail on the
defense provided in subsection (a) of this Code section and the landlord
refused the tender as provided under subsection (a) of this Code
section, the court shall issue an order requiring the tenant to pay to
the landlord all rents which are owed by the tenant and the costs of
the dispossessory warrant within three days of said order. Upon
failure of the tenant to pay such sum, a writ of possession shall issue.
Such payment shall not count as tender pursuant to subsection (a) of
this Code section.
(c) For a tenant who is not a tenant under a residential rental
agreement as defined in Code Section 44-7-30, tender and acceptance
of less than all rents allegedly owed plus the cost of the dispossessory
warrant shall not be a bar nor a defense to an action brought under
Code Section 44-7-50 but shall, upon proof of same, be considered by
the trial court when awarding damages.22
The new subsection (b) defines a very short time frame within which
tenants are required to pay all rents that they are adjudged to owe.226
If a tenant fails to pay those amounts within the time allowed, the
landlord will gain possession of the property.22 The new subsection
(c) clarifies what occurs when a commercial tenant tenders less than the
full amount owed. If the tenant is adjudged to have tendered less than
all that was owed, the landlord shall be entitled to a writ of possession.

224. 1998 Ga. Laws 1380, §§ 1-4 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-52 (1991 &
Supp. 1998), 44-7-54(c) (Supp. 1998), 44-7-55(a) (Supp. 1998), and 44-7-56 (1991 & Supp.
1998)).
225. 1998 Ga. Laws 1380, § 1 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 44-7-52(b), (c) (Supp.
1998)). Section 44-7-50 defines when a cause of action exists for dispossession of a tenant.
See O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
226. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-52(b) (Supp. 1998).
227. Id.
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The sums tendered in such cases will only serve to reduce the amount
of the money judgment entered against the tenant.228
Second, the legislature clarified what happens to funds paid into the
registry of a court under section 44-7-52 during the pendency of an
appeal from a judgment. Under the prior law, section 44-7-54 required
that any sums in dispute remain in the registry of the trial court until
the final resolution of an appeal. Under the new law, all sums that the
trial court finds are owed to the landlord, even if subject to dispute in
the appeal, will be paid to the landlord unless the tenant
shows good
229
cause for not doing so during the pendency of the appeal.
Third, the legislature changed the time period for filing an appeal
from a verdict in a dispossessory action. Under the prior law, parties
dissatisfied with the trial court's verdict in a dispossessory action had
ten days within which to file a notice of appeal. Under the new statute,
that time period is shortened to seven days.23 °
The other significant legislative development involved the creation of
a mechanism by which owners of property may have mechanics' and
materialmen's liens voided.
Under the Georgia Mechanics' and
Materialmen's Lien Act, the claimant must file the lien within three
months following the time when the amount claimed became due, and
must commence an action to establish the amount of the lien within
twelve months from the date the amount claimed became due.23'
Additionally, the claimant must file a Notice of Commencement of the
action in the land records of the county where the property subject to the
lien is located within fourteen days following commencement of that
action.232 The new statute states that if no such notice has been filed
within fourteen months after the date the amount claimed in the lien
became due, the owner of the property may have the lien voided.233
There are specific notice provisions and procedures that must be followed
in order for the owner to successfully void a lien under this new
statute.234 However, when those notice requirements have been
satisfied, the clerk of the superior court is required to mark on the

228. Id. § 44-7-52(c).
229. Compare O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54(c) (1991) with O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54(c) (Supp. 1998).
230. Compare O.C.G.A. § 44-7-56 (1991) with O.C.G.A. § 44-7-56 (Supp. 1998). Based
on the shortened time frame for filing a notice of appeal, the legislature also provided that
a writ of possession and execution writ for any money judgment must be effective at the
expiration of seven days after the date such judgment was entered. See O.C.G.A. § 44-755(a) (Supp. 1998).
231. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(2), (3) (Supp. 1998).
232. Id. § 44-14-361.1(a)(3).
233. Id. § 44-14-367 (Supp. 1998).
234. Id.

334

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

recorded lien the following language: "This lien is void of record
pursuant to Code Section 44-14-367 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated."235
At the same time, the legislature made a minor change to the statute
concerning mechanics' and materialmen's liens. The statute required
that a Notice of Commencement be executed under oath by the lien
claimant or the lien claimant's attorney.2 6 The legislature specifically
amended the statute to allow for a correction of a Notice of Commencement in the event that the lien claimant or its counsel failed to execute
the notice under oath. If that occurs, the notice may be amended
"without leave of court at any time before entry of the pretrial order and
thereafter by leave of court."" 7 Although it is not clear from the
language of the statute, the authors believe that the amendment to the
Notice of Commencement must be made during the pendency of any
action seeking to establish the amount of the claimant's lien, not during
an action against the property owner to foreclose the lien if two separate
actions are filed.

235.
236.
237.

Id. § 44-14-367(a).
Id. § 44-14-361(b) (1982).
Id. § 44-14-361.1(a)(3).

